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For the better part of the twentieth century, law firms hired, trained, and
grew through a stable and predictable pattern: hire new law school graduates,
monitor and evaluate their work, and pick promising attorneys from among
their ranks and elevate them to partner. Rinse, lather, repeat. A combination
of professional norms and organizational inertia made this approach the
dominant method of growth among large corporate law firms until changes in
legal market broke down these customary practices, ushering in a new era of
lawyer mobility. Now, it has become commonplace for lawyers to leave for greener
pastures as more law firms seek to grow their practices through lateral hiring.
The question that this Article seeks to answer is: what (if any) effect has
this change had on the stability of these law firms? Conventional wisdom holds
that law firms that grow through entry-level hiring and training young attorneys
(a practice long associated with the most prestigious “white shoe” firms) are more
stable in the long run than law firms that poach attorneys from other firms via
lateral acquisition. But why should hiring inexperienced and untested lawyers
result in greater success for the firm than hiring lawyers that are proven to be
competent and successful?
This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between
law firm profits, firm growth strategy, and the life course of large American
corporate law firms. I draw on an original longitudinal dataset to provide new
insights on the determinants and effects of firm growth over a quarter of a
century, from 1985 to 2011. I hypothesize that (1) “organic” growth, which
relies on entry-level hiring and internal promotion, helps successful firms protect
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their positions by creating dense firm networks that allow the firm to survive
threats to the organization, while (2) “mimetic” growth, which relies on firm
merger or mass lateral hiring fails to create these dense networks and thus fails
to provide long-term benefit to these firms.
Ultimately, my findings both corroborate and complicate the conventional
wisdom, with special resonances for what predicts the longevity of corporate law
firms. I find that less profitable firms pursued mimetic growth in response to the
organic growth of their more successful peers. In addition, controlling for
observed potential confounders, those firms that grew organically in response to
organizational need were at lower risk for dissolution than firms that
intentionally pursued a growth strategy involving mergers and acquisitions.
Furthermore, the increase in risk associated with this mimetic growth strategy
hits low-status law firms the hardest. I conclude that mimetic growth has the
potential to damage firm cohesion and upset the unique internal dynamics of
law firms, thus fraying the professional ties that bind clients and lawyers alike
to the firm.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 203
II. LAW FIRM GROWTH ........................................................................ 205
A. Structural Explanations of Firm Growth ........................... 206
1. Tournament Theory ..................................................... 207
2. Portfolio Theory ........................................................... 208
B. The Organizational Ecology of the Corporate Law Firm . 209
1. Changes in the Law Firm’s Ecological Niche.............. 210
2. A New Market for Law Firms........................................ 212
C. Types of Law Firm Growth ................................................. 213
1. Organic Growth: The Traditional Tournament ......... 214
2. Mimetic Growth: The Lateral Market for
Hired Guns ................................................................... 215
III. LAW FIRM REGULATION AND LAW FIRM STRUCTURE .................... 216
A. The Formal Business Organization of Law Firms ............. 217
B. The Legal Environment of Law Firms ............................... 219
1. Prohibitions on Lawyer Mobility are Unenforceable . 220
2. The Client Owns the Law Firm’s Work Product ......... 222
3. The Prohibition on Non-Lawyer Ownership
Favors Powerful Partners ............................................. 223
C. Internal Law Firm Dynamics and the Law Firm Network 223
D. Some Hypotheses About Firm Growth .............................. 227
1. The Initial Expansion in Firm Size is Directly
Related to Increases in Firm Profitability ................... 227
2. Successful Firms Are Less Likely to Grow Via
Merger or Lateral Hiring than

2022]

THE TIES THAT BIND

203

Firms That are Comparatively Less Profitable ........... 227
3. Firms that Pursue Mimetic Growth are
More Unstable than Firms that Grow Organically ..... 228
IV. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GROWTH AND MORTALITY ................ 229
A. The Data .............................................................................. 229
B. Law Firm Profits and Law Firm Growth ............................. 232
C. Law Firm Growth and Law Firm Survival .......................... 237
1. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for Firm Growth
Strategies....................................................................... 237
2. Cox Proportional Hazard Time-Varying Model ......... 238
3. Regression of Dissolution on Lateral Hiring Strategy 240
V. DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 241
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 243
APPENDIX A. DISSOLVED NLJ 350 LAW FIRMS (1987–2017) ............... 245
I. INTRODUCTION
“Now, everyone has become a free agent. It has changed and
destabilized the nature of the legal profession.”
– Stuart Saft, partner at Dewey & LeBouef LLP, on the
cause of Dewey & LeBouef’s collapse, May 4, 20121
“We’re delighted to have someone with Stuart’s expertise
and reputation join the firm’s already formidable real estate
practice.”
– Steven H. Davis, chairman of Dewey & LeBouef LLP,
on hiring Stuart Saft away from his previous firm, May
10, 20072
From the 1920s through the 1960s—a so-called “Golden Age” of
legal practice3—elite law firms were the very model of stability.
Partners were loyal to their firms, firms were loyal to their partners,

1

James B. Stewart, Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firm’s New Reality, N.Y. TIMES (May
4, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/business/deweys-collapse-unders
cores-a-new-reality-for-law-firms-common-sense.html.
2
Angelo Kakolyris, Stuart Saft Joins LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, BUS. WIRE
(May 10, 2007), http://www.proquest.com/wire-feeds/stuart-saft-joins-leboeuf-lambgreene-amp-macrae/docview/445036167/se-2?accountid=13793.
3
Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L.
REV. 549, 554–55 (1996).
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and norms of professionalism and collegiality kept the bonds between
lawyers and law firms strong.4
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the business environment for
law firms changed dramatically. Corporate consolidation reduced the
pool of clients, while the rise of finance created more lucrative legal
work.5 Firms that were initially successful in navigating this changing
landscape were rewarded with increased business, which created
opportunities for growth via expanded entry-level hiring.6 Other firms,
however, pursued an alternative method of growth in which they
brought on established lawyers by hiring lateral partners and/or
practice groups from rival firms, acquiring a smaller firm, or merging
with a peer firm.7
At the same time that corporate law firms were expanding
through these two methods, legal practice—once characterized by
organizational stability, predictable career paths, and conservative
management—became more volatile and dynamic. As lawyers moved
between firms, clients followed “rainmaker” partners to new firms, and
the firms left behind suddenly collapsed. This period thus offers an
important site from which to analyze the determinants of firm
expansion and firm mortality.
In this Article, I use insights from organizational theory to analyze
the internal dynamics of law firms, review how professional legal ethics
rules shape firm behavior, and examine why changes in a firm’s
network of client ties could affect the firm’s mortality risk. I propose
the theory that (1) “organic” growth—growth through entry-level
hiring and internal promotion—helps successful firms protect their
positions by creating dense networks between firms and clients that
allow the firm to survive threats to the organization, while (2)
“mimetic” growth—growth through firm merger or lateral hiring—
fails to create these dense networks and thus undermines the firm’s
long-term stability.

4

Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations: Explaining the Growth of
Large Law Firms, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 733, 735 (1992) (reviewing MARC GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM
(1991)).
5
See generally James W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year
2000, 41 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1988).
6
See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 88–89 (1991).
7
Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing
and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988).
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To examine the factors that lead firms to adopt different
strategies, and test whether growth strategy contributes to firm
mortality, I compiled a longitudinal dataset that tracks the most
prominent American corporate law firms from 1985 to 2011. I
collected and synthesized information from industry periodicals,
contemporaneous news reports, and the law firms themselves to create
a dataset with detailed law firm headcounts, partner and associate
numbers, profits per partner, growth rates, profit trends, lateral hiring
events, acquisitions, and dissolutions. Armed with this unique dataset,
I examine the potential causes and consequences of law firm growth
and law firm mortality.
I proceed in this Article as follows: in Part II, I introduce the
recent phenomenon of rapid law firm expansion and explain why that
expansion has been so difficult to theorize. I conclude Part II by
introducing a broader perspective that incorporates the environment
in which firms are situated and examining the different types of firm
growth as a response to changes in the organizational ecology that law
firms inhabit. In Part III, I examine the regulations that shape
professional organizations and the complicated internal dynamics of
the law firm that are, in part, a consequence of that legal regime. I
conclude Part III by hypothesizing that a firm’s growth strategy can
impact a firm’s internal dynamics in ways that fortify or attenuate its
stability. In Part IV, I examine longitudinal data on law firm growth
and suggest that mimetic growth may be an organizational response to
loss of status. I then examine the relationship between a firm’s method
of growth and its likelihood of dissolution. Part V concludes by noting
the implications of these results for our understanding of the legal
profession.
II. LAW FIRM GROWTH
The most dramatic change in the law firm as an organizational
form has been the precipitous and seemingly unstoppable rise over the
past half-century in the headcount of the nation’s top corporate law
firms. In the early 1960s, the largest firm in the country had 125
lawyers, and only twenty law firms had more than 50 attorneys.8 In
1983, the average size of the top 100 law firms was roughly 217

8

RAISE THE BAR: REAL WORLD SOLUTIONS FOR A TROUBLED PROFESSION 34
(Lawrence J. Fox ed., 2007) [hereinafter RAISE THE BAR]; ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL
STREET LAWYER, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN?, 34–35, 43 (1964).
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attorneys.9 In 2004, America’s largest law firm had 2,992 lawyers. 10
Today, the largest law firm employs a truly staggering 4,700 lawyers.11
While general growth in the market for legal services can explain why
there are more lawyers now than there were in 1960, scholars have
struggled to explain precisely why the size of the most prominent law
firms continues to swell at an almost exponential rate, as I will explain
in the following section. I argue that the traditional explanations that
have been proffered for the growth of law firms are inapt and suggest
that instead we should look to the broader environment in which law
firms are situated to explain the pressures on law firms to grow.
A. Structural Explanations of Firm Growth
Traditional economic explanations for large-scale organizational
growth—the benefits derived from economies of scale or the
monopolization of a market—are inapplicable to the largest law firms,
as (1) large law firms do not achieve any kind of cost savings vis- à-vis
their smaller competitors (in fact, they generally charge much more
for the same work),12 (2) the cost of monitoring attorneys to avoid
malpractice is higher in larger law firms given the complexity of the
work and the specialized nature of firm practice,13 and (3) complicated
conflict of interest rules actually make administration of larger firms
more costly than smaller firms.14 Other structural theories of growth
have been advanced, but they each have their flaws.

9
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV.
313, 314 n. 3 (1984).
10
RAISE THE BAR, supra note 8, at 34.
11
See The NLJ 500: Ranked by Head Count, NAT’L L.J. (June 23, 2021),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/06/23/the-nlj-500-main-chart-3
/?tokenvalue=6DC955D2-936F-4B77-A645-2618009D1C29 (showing the largest law
firm, Baker & McKenzie, actually shrunk year-over-year).
12
See Peter D. Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human Capital
Structures and Organizational Capabilities, 48 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 671, 685–86 (1995).
13
Arleen Leibowitz & Robert Tollison, Free Riding, Shirking, and Team Production in
Legal Partnerships, 18 ECON.INQUIRY 380, 388 (1980); Robert E. O’Malley, Preventing
Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 325, 327–28 (1989); David B.
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An
Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 493 (1996).
14
SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE
368 (2002); see Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers’ Conflicts of Interest, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 586 (1991).
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1. Tournament Theory
Galanter and Palay’s “tournament theory” holds that law firm
growth is a product of the law firm’s internal labor market.15
According to the theory, associates are hired to perform the work that
the partnership generates and are put through a promotion-to-partner
tournament (otherwise known as the “up-or-out” system) as a means of
maintaining associate loyalty and effort.16 A certain percentage of
associates must be made partner as a reward for winning the
tournament to keep the structure credible for the remaining associates
who would otherwise have incentive to shirk or take work for
themselves—this system of ongoing hiring and promotion creates a
geometric rate of growth.17
Yet contrary to Galanter’s theory, neither law firm growth nor
promotion occur automatically.
Despite the theory’s accurate
reflection of the mechanism by which associates advance to
partnership—and its evocation of the cutthroat atmosphere such a
tournament creates—law firms, nonetheless, often vary considerably in
their partnership promotion rates.18 Another problem is that law firm
structure is more flexible than Galanter’s theory might admit. More
recently, Galanter acknowledged that multiple alternatives to
partnership have become available to losers of the tournament—”of
counsel” positions (permanent associates), non-equity partnerships,
etc.—and that the tournament is therefore not strictly a tournament
after all.19 Furthermore, there is no evidence that the credibility of the
associate promotion tournament is at all a consideration for law firm
partners. Indeed, immediately following the financial crisis in 2008,
law firms laid off several thousand associates and all but reneged on
agreements to hire thousands more new law school graduates,
apparently oblivious to the fact that these moves would clearly violate
the terms of the “tournament.”20

15

GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 6, at 100–03.
Id.
17
Id.
18
John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson & Edward O. Laumann, The Scale of Justice:
Observations on the Transformation of Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 337, 345
(2001).
19
Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: The Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1875–76 (2008).
20
Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–31 (2011).
16
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The larger problem with tournament theory, however, is that it
mistakes lawyers for a law firm’s critical resource21 when a law firm’s
most important (some might argue its only) resource is its stable of
clients. Promotion to partner does not occur whenever an associate
has “earned” it in the tournament—it occurs when the associate can
demonstrate that she is necessary to maintain a client relationship or
has the capability to generate business for the law firm.
2. Portfolio Theory
Another popular theory is that law firm growth is driven by
“portfolio theory”—the idea that law firms add attorneys and practice
areas to hedge against the loss of a client or downturn in a sector.22
However, this theory, too, crashes against the rocky shoals of empirical
evidence, as diversification can only work within a law firm that can
exercise control over its members to keep the law firm together. While
high degrees of social cohesion within law firms have been shown to
suppress status competition and prevent practice groups from
breaking off,23 the increased size of corporate law firms makes high
degrees of social cohesion impossible; law firms lack strict controls to
keep partners from electively leaving the firm.24
In truth, partners in large law firms can and do leave their firms
for greener pastures when they overperform relative to the rest of the
partners in the law firm.25 And on the other side of this, law firms
routinely shed practice areas that do not deliver high profitability to
the firm. For example, white-shoe law firms traditionally had a trusts
and estates practice for wealthy individual clients, but the work did not
generate outsize bills or attract price-insensitive clients; the largest law
firms are increasingly dropping it from their areas of practice.26
Likewise, large law firms used to represent corporations in individual

21
See Peter D. Sherer & Kyungmook Lee, Institutional Change in Large Law Firms: A
Resource Dependency and Institutional Perspective, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 102, 108 (2002).
22
Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 9, at 329.
23
EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF
COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP 173–75 (2001).
24
See infra Part II.B.2.
25
See infra Part III. Law Firm Regulation and Law Firm Structure where the
dynamics of this are discussed.
26
Peter Lattman, Debevoise & Plimpton Drops Trusts and Estates Practice, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 2013, 9:03 PM), https://archive.nytimes.com/dealbook.nytimes.com/2013
/02/05/debevoise-plimpton-drops-trusts-and-estates-practice.
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product liability suits,27 though as these suits became more common
and formulaic, this repetitive work was outsourced to smaller local law
firms who could provide cheaper services. Indeed, lawyers who
specialize in practice areas where market competition is driving down
prices are leaving large law firm practice in order to maintain business
they would otherwise not be able to keep at the prices their firms
charge.28 There is little empirical support for diversification as a driver
of the increased size of law firms.
A flaw common to these structural theories is that they do not take
into consideration changes in the environment of the organization
(either its resource base or the manner in which it is regulated) as a
driver of law firm growth. Another flaw is that they assume that law
firm growth occurs for the same reason for all the firms in the
population. A final flaw is that these theories assume that law firm
management responds rationally to major structural changes in the
legal economy, even though these firms are often operating in an
uncertain environment with incomplete information. A broader
perspective—one that incorporates the law firm as an actor operating
in a dense, highly regulated field with dependent relationships to
other organizations—is necessary.
B. The Organizational Ecology of the Corporate Law Firm
Like all organizations, the organizational behavior of corporate
law firms depends on the environmental conditions of the industry in
which they are situated.29 In addition to the environmental conditions
that specifically affect the practice of law, however, law firms further
depend on the demography of the organizations they service—that is,
their success or failure depends not only on their environment, but
also on the environment on which they are dependent.30 In the case
of law firms, that means their survival depends on the conditions of the
large corporations that they serve. Understanding the growth of law

27

Margot Slade, Personal-Injury Lawyer: New Era, New Image, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
1988),
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/09/us/the-law-personal-injury-lawyernew-era-new-image.html.
28
See Hilary Potkewitz, Partners Flee Big Law Firms to be Masters of Their Domain, 26
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Aug. 16, 2010), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20100815
/SMALLBIZ/308159975/partners-flee-big-law-firms-to-go-their-own-way.
29
Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, The Population Ecology of Organizations, 82
AM. J. SOCIO. 929, 934 (1977).
30
JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 3 (1st ed. 2003).
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firms over the last twenty-five years requires an understanding of both
the role of the law firm and the larger corporate ecology.
1. Changes in the Law Firm’s Ecological Niche
The services that large corporate law firms provide are tailored to
help successful, mature organizations navigate and succeed in their
particular organizational environment. Broadly speaking, the practice
areas of corporate law firms exist to achieve three goals: protect the
client’s market share, maintain the client’s access to capital, and
minimize the client’s regulatory or litigation losses. As such, most large
law firms offer a similar menu of practices: intellectual property and
anti-trust litigation (protect market share); mergers and acquisitions,
capital markets, and structured finance (access to capital); and class
action/mass tort defense, tax, insurance, and securities fraud/white
collar defense (minimize losses). The focus in each of these practice
areas is on large-scale matters where the corporate client is less
sensitive to price concerns and thus where the law firm can maximize
profits—e.g., multibillion-dollar transactions, “bet the company”
litigation, or securities lawsuits/government investigations where the
company (or its directors and officers) are at risk.31
Two major structural shifts fundamentally changed corporate
America beginning in the 1980s: corporate consolidation and the
financialization of the economy. First, the massive wave of mergers
and acquisitions that the Reagan administration’s relaxed antitrust
enforcement brought on had the effect of greatly increasing the
amount of legal work available for large law firms.32 Figure 1 is a graph
of pre-1985 mergers and acquisitions activity, combining several data
sources to show that transactions began to increase sharply during the
early-to-mid-1980s.
Figure 2, from the Institute for Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Alliances, shows that the rise in corporate

31

For example, in 2008, the electronics manufacturer Siemens paid over one
billion dollars to a single firm, “Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, to conduct an internal
investigation” of an international bribery scandal, thereby avoiding a federal criminal
conviction that would have likely destroyed the company. See Siri Schubert & T.
Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html.
32
Jones, supra note 5, at 685 (“[M]ergers and acquisitions practice dominates the
work of corporate lawyers. Most corporations spend inordinate amounts of time and
money dealing with the current wave of takeover attempts.”); ROBERT L. NELSON,
PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 200
(1988); Heinz, Nelson, & Laumann, supra note 18, at 342.
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combinations continued to increase dramatically in the post-1985
period as well.
Figure 1: Golbe and White’s Graph of Pre-1985 Merger Trends33

The secondary effect of this massive increase in complex
corporate transactions was a net reduction in the number of large
corporate clients. As a result of this consolidation, more wealth became
concentrated in the hands of fewer and larger corporations—in 1955,
Fortune 500 companies had revenue equivalent to 39% of GDP; in
2006, the Fortune 500 had revenue equivalent to 73.4% of GDP.34 And
as the economy became more and more centralized in the hands of a
few large law firms, the pool of clients for lawyers who provide services
for established companies shrunk.35

33
Devra L. Golbe & Lawrence J. White, Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy:
An Aggregate and Historical Overview, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 25, 37 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988).
34
Ellen
McGirt,
A
Banner
Year,
FORTUNE
(Apr.
17,
2006),
https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/04/17
/8374302/index.htm.
35
S. S. Samuelson & L. J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of Law Firm Profitability, 70 B.U.
L. REV. 185, 189–90 (1990); John P. Heinz, When Law Firms Fail, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
67, 74 (2009).
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Figure 2: IMAA Graph of Post-1985 Merger Trends 36

The second shift—related to the first—was the growing
financialization of the American economy, signified by the rise in
profit and prestige of financial services companies—including private
equity firms, investment banks, and insurance companies.37 These
companies generate a greater demand for high-end legal services on a
per capita basis than companies in other industries, as financial service
companies rely on legally binding agreements to a much greater
degree than the manufacturers of the industrial age.38 As these
financial firms came to dominate the economy, corporate legal work
became more prolific and more lucrative.
2. A New Market for Law Firms
The initial effect of consolidation and financialization is that law
firms that were well-positioned in the new market were able to thrive.
Law firms obtained advantages in this new market by virtue of either
having experienced practitioners in the needed practice areas (such as
36

M&A Review 2019, INST. FOR MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & ALLS. (IMAA),
http://imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics (last visited Sept. 20,
2022).
37
Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3 SOCIO.-ECON.
REV. 173, 180–81 (2005).
38
Robert Bell, Some Determinants of Corporate Use of Attorneys 22–24 (Georgetown
Univ., Working Paper No. 9926, 1991) (“Companies dealing with financial services and
insurance and those in the transportation industry are the most intensive consumers
of legal services.”). But see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55, 62 (1963) (finding that industrial firms were
reticent to rely on lawyers and contracts).
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Davis Polk & Wardwell’s experience in mergers and acquisitions as J.P.
Morgan’s longtime counsel),39 being innovators in financial markets
(such as Marty Lipton of Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz’s development
of the “poison pill” corporate takeover defense),40 or by having strong
ties to clients who themselves thrived in the new environment (such as
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett’s willingness to represent leveraged
buyout firms during a time when such firms were outsiders on Wall
Street).41 These law firms saw an immediate increase in work, both
from the mergers and acquisitions themselves and from the increased
amount of legal work from newly consolidated clients.42
The long-term effect of these changes was increased competition
among law firms. When the unrestricted movement of lawyers
(discussed in Part III.A) is combined with a shrinking number of
clients—who are in turn offering a larger volume of more lucrative
work—conditions are ripe for both fierce competition for clients from
rival firms (external threats to law firms) and the potential for their
own lawyers to grab clients and leave (internal threats to law firms).
Lawyers who could singlehandedly bring clients to their firms (or take
clients to rival firms)—so-called “rainmakers”—thus had dramatically
increased leverage over other lawyers in these firms.43
It is in this environment—well-positioned law firms experiencing
rapidly increasing workloads, and competition among law firms for
clients intensifying—that the growth of law firms into the current
global mega-firms began.
C. Types of Law Firm Growth
The relationship between organization size and organizational
change has been analyzed extensively—including studies of the

39

Francis M. Carroll, Review of The Anointed: New York’s White Shoe Law Firms—How
They Started, How They Grew, and How They Ran the Country, by Jeremiah D. Lambert and
Geoffrey S. Stewart, 56 CAN. J. HIST., 424, 42526 (2021).
40
Martin M. Cohen, Note, “Poison Pills” as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in
the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 460 n.3 (1987).
41
See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCO 192–93 (Harper Bus. 2008) (1989).
42
If Client A (represented by Firm A) merges with Client B (represented by Firm
B), the surviving corporation needs only one firm to represent it, and the winning firm
stands to inherit the work from both Client A and Client B.
43
RAISE THE BAR, supra note 8, at 107; NELSON, supra note 32, at 203–04, 224–25.
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relationship between size and survival,44 between size and conformity
to industry leaders,45 and between size and formal differentiation.46
Organization size, however, is often taken as the starting point for
examining the effects of size on organization activity and organization
survival, without an analysis of the method of organizational growth.
Because of their unique regulatory regime and the importance of the
lawyer-client relationship, law firms avail themselves of two methods of
organizational expansion: organic and mimetic.
1. Organic Growth: The Traditional Tournament
Law firms traditionally added to their ranks by having young
attorneys join them as associates directly out of law school.47 This was
the method of law firm hiring prior to the changes in the law firm
environment and the increase in inter-firm competition.48 As the
sociologist Erwin Smigel saw it, the purpose of selectively hiring and
intensively training attorneys over a number of years allowed law firms
to signal to clients that the firm was committed to providing the client
with a high standard of practice even after the current group of
partners retires.49 Hiring of lateral attorneys was rare and considered
a breach of professional norms.50 Instead, law firms hired young
attorneys to handle work that senior attorneys brought to the firm—
the paradigmatic exchange between a lawyer with clients but no time
and a lawyer with time but no clients.51
To grow through this strategy requires a law firm to be patient, as
many (many) young attorneys never advance past the associate level at

44

David N. Barron, Elizabeth West & Michael T. Hannan, A Time to Grow and a
Time to Die: Growth and Mortality of Credit Unions in New York City, 1914-1990, 100 AM. J.
SOCIO. 381, 382 (1994).
45
Heather A. Haveman, Organizational Size and Change: Diversification in the Savings
and Loan Industry After Deregulation, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 20, 21–23 (1993).
46
Peter M. Blau, A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations, 35 AM. SOCIO.
REV. 201, 204 (1970); John R. Kimberly, Organizational Size and the Structuralist
Perspective: A Review, Critique, and Proposal, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 571, 571 (1976).
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LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 489 (3d. ed. 2005); Erwin
O. Smigel, The Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm, 25 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 56, 57–58 (1960).
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See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and Lawyer
Mobility: Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 449, 450 (2011).
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See Smigel, supra note 47, at 62–63.
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SMIGEL, supra note 8, at 57.
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the firm that initially recruited them.52 Because it is difficult to identify
high-value attorneys during the recruitment process,53 the law firm
must hire large cohorts and evaluate them during the promotion-topartner tournament (the “organic” growth strategy), thus requiring
law firms to make large up-front capital investments in each cohort.
While early-career associates do contribute to the firm’s bottom line
through their billable hours, the profit margins on their time are lower
than those of more experienced attorneys, as they bill out at lower rates
and require more supervision from experienced attorneys.54
2. Mimetic Growth: The Lateral Market for Hired Guns
The other method of growth is to acquire established lawyers or
entire firms through merger with a peer firm, acquisition of a smaller
firm, or by hiring lateral partners or practice groups from rival firms.
While once taboo,55 this became a popular method for law firm growth;
in one sample of large law firms between 2000 and 2006, 48% of the
new partners were lateral hires.56 This method is often less expensive
in the short-term than organic growth, as established attorneys bring
clients with them to their new firm (or they are prominent enough in
the field to attract new clients to the firm).57 Thus, a law firm can
recoup an investment in an established attorney much faster than an
investment in an entry-level attorney, even though established
attorneys cost more. Note that this method brings its own risk—
established attorneys often bargain for guaranteed salaries in
exchange for switching law firms; if revenue declines, the firm will have
to cut deeply into the profit shares for the pre-existing partners. The
collapse of Dewey & LeBouef was caused in part by lavish pay packages
doled out to lateral partners who were unable to bring in a
commensurate level of business.58
Because this alternative method is rarely in response to a direct
organizational need—bringing aboard rainmaker attorneys with
52

Id. at 104; Sherer, supra note 12, at 673.
Renee M Landers, James B Rebitzer & Lowell J Taylor, Rat Race Redux: Adverse
Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 335
(1996) (describing how firms screen associates through the partnership tournament
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See Sherer, supra note 13, at 673.
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Jones, supra note 5; Hillman, supra note 7; Samuelson & Jaffe, supra note 35, at
185–86.
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Heinz, supra note 35, at 68.
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Hillman, supra note 7, at 12.
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established practices and clients would not necessarily help a firm meet
increased client demand—I argue that this method of growth is
“mimetic” and arises when a firm observes its peers growing and
expands to keep up.59
In organizational theory, “mimetic isomorphism” refers to the
phenomenon whereby organizations look to their most respected
peers—in this case, the very top law firms—and adopt their structures
and practices in an effort to maintain legitimacy in their field.60
Examples of mimetic isomorphism in the legal profession are
abound—from the Cravath partnership structure, to lock-step
compensation systems for associates, to the wave of partner deequitization that occurred in the early 2000s.61 Even the physical
location of offices can be mimetic. While the first major wave of
overseas law firm expansion occurred at the behest of clients, the
second wave unfolded as a costly scramble to maintain legitimacy in
the face of peer law firm international expansion.62 The publication
and ranking of law firm size could also contribute to the desire of midtier firms to pursue growth—if prestige and high profits remain
elusive, law firm management may consider size an attainable goal.
Aiding these law firms in their quest to mimic the growth of the
leading organizations is the legal regime that allows for easy lawyer
movement and the internal tensions between lawyers and their firms
that generate opportunities to poach lawyers from other firms. Both
are discussed in the next section.
III. LAW FIRM REGULATION AND LAW FIRM STRUCTURE
A key part of understanding the ecology in which law firms are
situated is the regulatory framework that strictly controls what
restrictions law firms can place on their members. Law firms are
formally organized into non-hierarchical business entities, which are
then subject to ethical rules limiting the power of the organization to
control their members, both of which create a dynamic where the
59
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62
Debora L. Spar, Lawyers Abroad: The Internationalization of Legal Practice, 39 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 8, 13 (1997).

2022]

THE TIES THAT BIND

217

strength of the firm’s internal network—and not any legal or
contractual duty—determines influences the bond between lawyer and
law firm.63
A. The Formal Business Organization of Law Firms
Law firms have historically been organized as partnerships, and
with the statutory creation of limited liability partnerships (LLP), the
majority of large corporate law firms are organized as LLPs.64 An LLP
is a specific kind of general partnership where each partner has the
power to act on behalf of and bind the partnership (absent provisions
to the contrary in the partnership agreement) but enjoys limited
liability protection from the debts and obligations that the partnership
incurs.65 Moreover, LLPs are taxed as pass-through entities, meaning
that a law firm’s earnings are not taxed at the entity level (as with a
corporation) but instead are distributed directly to the partners of the
firm, who pay income taxes on their distributions.66 While some states
allow any business entity to form an LLP, many states limit the use of
the LLPs to professional organizations exclusively.67
While law firms can and do organize themselves using other kinds
of business entities, including limited liability companies (LLC),
professional corporations (PC),68 or professional limited liability
corporations (PLLC)—depending on state availability—the largest law
firms almost exclusively avail themselves of the LLP for several reasons.
First, organizational status change can disrupt not only formal
relationships—contracts with both clients and non-client
counterparties would need to be transferred to the new entity and
novated—but also relationships between attorneys within the law firm.
63

See Burk and McGowan, supra note 20.
Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical
Study, 58 BUS. L. 1387, 1395 (2003).
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See generally, ALAN PALMITER, FRANK PARTNOY, & ELIZABETH PULLMAN, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH ch. 3 (3d Ed. 2019).
66
Id. at 196.
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Id. at 188.
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In a development that perhaps amuses only me, the practice at the law firm
Kirkland & Ellis LLP is for partners to incorporate single-shareholder professional
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the attorney. See Roy Strom, How Kirkland ‘Partners in Name Only’ Live in Limbo,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document
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partners who are really contracted employees and not legally partners in the
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The creation of a new entity would necessitate creating a new
foundational document to which all attorneys would have to sign on (a
new operating agreement for LLCs and PLLCs and new articles of
incorporation and bylaws for PCs), a move which could potentially reopen negotiations between member attorneys and firm management
over the various arrangements of power and distribution of capital
among the attorneys. As such, it is often in the interest of law firm
management to muddle through with the current arrangement, rather
than upset the previously negotiated terms of the organization.
Second, the largest law firms almost all have multijurisdictional
practices,69 and an advantage of the LLP is that it is a form common to
every state.70 By contrast, rules for PCs vary across states (including
statutory limits on the number of attorneys who can own shares in a
PC), the LLC is not always available for professional practices (e.g.
California bars their use for professional firms), and not every
jurisdiction has established the PLLC form.71 Moreover, large law
firms generally do not structure themselves as PCs because, unlike the
LLP and LLC forms, some PCs do not get the benefit of pass-through
tax status.72
Finally, organizational inertia and path dependence are such that
an organization is unlikely to make a disruptive change to their legal
status unless the reward for doing so is particularly large. In this case,
each of the legal forms has similar pass-through tax status, membermanagement structure, and liability protections, so the benefits of
change can be minor compared to the costs.73
As a result, the historical law firm—a partnership where partner
attorneys are residual claimants on firm income—remains the
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dominant organizational form,74 with the minor tweak of extending
limited liability protection to the law firm’s partners such that they are
personally shielded from the firm’s debts and obligations.75 The result
is an organizational form where admittance to the partnership is
closely guarded, but once an attorney becomes a partner in the law
firm, they have weak legal ties to the organization itself, both in terms
of personal liability and access to the law firm’s capital. The former is
because partner liability is limited to the capital contributions of each
individual partner, there is no legal mechanism to bind an attorney’s
personal fortunes to the fortunes of the firm itself, and the latter is
because, unlike with a corporation, the law firm’s income is pooled
and distributed on an annual basis, so there are no reserves of capital
whose future distribution could induce an attorney to stay with a law
firm over the long-term.76
B. The Legal Environment of Law Firms
As explained above, large law firms are primarily structured as
limited liability partnerships (or professional limited liability
companies, which have similar liability protections and impose similar
duties on members). As such, partners owe fiduciary duties to one
another by virtue of their membership in the partnership.77
Ordinarily, such fiduciary duties would prohibit opportunistic
behavior from law firm members, including self-dealing or taking of
opportunities that rightfully belong to the firm itself.78 However,
ethical rules established by state bars not only modify those fiduciary
duties but affirmatively prohibit law firms from adding other provisions
to the partnership agreement that could effectively bind a lawyer to a
law firm, as I discuss in the next section.
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See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 (Mass. 1989) (holding
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1. Prohibitions on Lawyer Mobility are Unenforceable
Mr. Saft from Dewey & LeBouef was partially correct (if a little
hypocritical) when he boasted that lawyers were all free agents now. In
reality, lawyers have always been free agents, at least in a formal sense,
because professional regulations bar restrictions on practicing,
competing, or taking clients—meaning there is no formal barrier to a
partner leaving to join a rival firm or to start their own practice.
First, the ethical codes of legal practice bar non-compete and nonsolicitation agreements between law firms and attorneys under the
theory that such agreements infringe on a client’s right to select the
representation of their choosing. Specifically, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 states that “[a] lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership, shareholders,
operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon
retirement.”79
In interpreting this rule, the American Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics (“ABA Ethics Committee”) initially
found that post-employment covenants restricting competition were
per se invalid under the Code of Professional Responsibility.80 The
ABA Ethics Committee then found that restrictions on representing
former clients were also prohibited,81 and finally found that
communications from departing lawyers to firm clients were
permissible so long as they were not disparaging.82 Thus, by
developing ethical guidelines for “grabbing and leaving,” the ABA
Ethics Committee removed legal ambiguity around partnership
withdrawal, making it easier for departing partners to seamlessly
transition out of their law firms.83
State courts have enforced and extended this principle to void
both explicit non-compete provisions and any contractual provision
seen to inhibit the free movement of lawyers from and between law
Courts have also consistently voided non-solicitation
firms.84
79
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provisions restricting representation of firm clients after withdrawal.85
Where other organizations (medical practices, accounting firms, etc.)
can deter or even prevent competition from their members through
contractual arrangements,86 law firms exist in an environment where
their member attorneys perpetually threaten to exit the firm and take
with them their human capital, client relationships, and fellow
attorneys.87
This threat of “grabbing and leaving”—and the increasing
frequency in which attorneys act upon the threat—has led to many
commentators speculating on the end of loyalty in the legal
profession.88 But, as with many shifts in social norms, it is not entirely
clear how to disentangle exogenous environmental factors (the sharp
increase in volume and profitability of corporate legal work and courts
enforcing free movement of lawyers and clients) from an endogenous

Review Consultants, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
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Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993) (allowing a partnership agreement
that withheld certain benefits to departing partners, though the provision was found
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85
See generally Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, 902 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. 1995)
(determining that a non-solicitation clause restricted “the client’s freedom of choice”);
Cohen v. Graham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (voiding a partnership
covenant that prohibited a departing attorney from representing firm clients).
86
In most jurisdictions, contractual restrictions on professionals (such as
accountants) are examined under a “reasonableness” standard, with an exception for
non-compete provisions for physicians, which can be voided when it is in the “public
interest” to do so. Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition
Clauses in Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31
AM. BUS. L.J. 31, 3437 (1993). Only among lawyers are non-competes per se invalid.
See Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and the Legal Profession, 29 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 423, 43738 (1984).
87
See Sela Stroud, Non-Compete Agreements: Weighing the Interests of Profession and Firm,
53 ALA. L. REV. 1023, 102728 (2002); Ribstein, supra note 76, at 80405.
88
William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. LJ. 151, 152 (1986); see
Vincent Robert Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and
Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 118 (1988);
Hillman, supra note 48, at 469; Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Underlying Causes of
Withdrawal and Expulsion of Partners from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073, 1074
(1998); Leslie D. Corwin, Response to Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles
on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055, 105557
(1998) (written by a law firm partner who left her law firm while she was writing an
article on the ethical implications of partners leaving law firms).

222

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:201

change in professional or organizational culture.89 Regardless, the
inability of law firms to discipline or punish defecting partners greatly
increases the leverage of partners who can credibly draw clients to a
new law firm.
2. The Client Owns the Law Firm’s Work Product
In addition to the prohibition on impairing partner withdrawals,
the ethical rules regarding client files give control of work product
produced on behalf of the client to the client itself.90 Unlike a standard
knowledge-intensive firm—say, Google or a biotech firm—where the
firm owns employees’ work product, an attorney’s work product
belongs to the client, and the law firm must produce client files in case
of the termination of the relationship. As such, a partner can decamp
to another law firm, take a client with them, and then the client can
retrieve that partner’s work product from the original firm. A law firm
cannot retain the work produced on behalf of a client, and thus they
cannot leverage that work to retain the client.
Nor can the law firm protect its legal work (or its strategies) as
intellectual property under patent or copyright like a typical company
could.91 Moreover, even if the law firm could obtain the rights to
specific works, much of the legal work product that does not go directly
to the client is publicly filed—either with a court or a government
agency—and a departing partner can easily make copies.

89

See generally Ann Mische, Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (John Scott & Peter J. Carrington eds., 2014).
See, e.g., Neil J. Dilloff, The Changing Cultures and Economics of Large Law Firm Practice and
Their Impact on Legal Education, 70 MD. L. REV. 341, 349 (2011); Elizabeth Chambliss,
Measuring Law Firm Culture, in 52 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 1, 3 (2010);
Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutional Sources of Organizational Culture in Major Law Firms, in
INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT 101, 109
(Lynne G. Zucker ed., 1988).
90
Allison D. Rhodes & Robert W. Hillman, Client Files and Digital Law Practices:
Rethinking Old Concepts in an Era of Lawyer Mobility, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 915
(2010); Brian J. Slovut, Eliminating Conflict at the Termination of the Attorney-Client
Relationship: A Proposed Standard Governing Property Rights in the Client’s File, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 1483, 1485 (1992).
91
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods
Cannot Be Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 366 (2007); see Stanley F. Birch, Jr.,
Copyright Protection for Attorney Work Product: Practical and Ethical Considerations, 10 J.
INTEL. PROP. L. 255, 25960 (2003).

2022]

THE TIES THAT BIND

223

3. The Prohibition on Non-Lawyer Ownership Favors
Powerful Partners
Finally, regulations prohibit ownership of law firms by non-lawyers
(and therefore neither investors nor managers can have an equity
stake in a law firm).92 In practice, this has meant that lawyers
determine the organizational form of the firm, and likewise lawyers
dominate the formal managerial positions within a law firm (save the
specialized positions over which other professions have made
successful jurisdictional claims, like accounting or human resources).
Non-lawyer managers acting in their self-interest would fight for an
organizational structure that maximized managerial control over the
firm; lawyer-managers, by contrast, serve a dual role, and as such have
a competing incentive to promote their own autonomy and maintain
a law firm structure which gives individual lawyers power instead of the
firm.93 By potentially empowering individual attorneys at the expense
of the firm, these regulations shape both the structure of these law
firms and the strategy of the lawyers who work within them, which is
addressed next.
C. Internal Law Firm Dynamics and the Law Firm Network
Most theories about the internal dynamics of a law firm posit the
firm as a site of individual exchange or an organization designed to
optimize member contributions. According to the transactional
perspective, law firms offer lawyers a place to acquire and develop
human capital—both general (skills and experience) and firmspecific—while reaping the marginal value of their labor.94 Ribstein’s
“reputational bonding” theory holds that law firms essentially lend
their reputation to young, unproven attorneys in exchange for their
labor, and that the attorneys in turn give their time to the firm to build
their own reputational capital.95 The “internal referral” theory of Burk
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and McGowan, on the other hand, argues that the law firm facilitates
the reciprocal exchange of skills, information, and clients among its
lawyers, building valuable social capital for the individual members of
the firm.96 And Sherer identifies the law firm as a hierarchical
structure designed to maximize the human capital contributions of its
attorneys.97 While all of these are persuasive descriptions of different
functions the law firm performs, they all assume that a firm is either a
collection of atomistic individuals or a single-minded entity.98
Instead, the law firm is an organization best understood as a
network of integrated actors.99 The network perspective offers a
middle ground—one that allows for strategic behavior but also
identifies the influence of organizational structure on individual
action. Moreover, the law firm network can incorporate each of the
functions—human capital development, reputational capital
exchange, distribution of social capital, and the reciprocal sharing of
resources—articulated in the previous paragraph.
Figure 3 below is a visualization of the network of lawyers in a
representative large law firm.100 Each node represents a lawyer (colorcoded by practice area), and the edges between the nodes represent
ties between the lawyers, formed when those particular lawyers work
together on a project. The actors in the network are arranged
according to the ties they have formed (actors who have ties to one
another are placed closer together) and according to their centrality
in the network (actors who serve as a bridge between groups in the
firm are placed closer to the center of the network).
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Figure 3: The Law Firm as a Network of Lawyers101

If a law firm was a collection of atomized lawyers pursuing their
own ends, the network would be sparse, with few connections between
lawyers. The observed network does not support this view, however,
and instead shows numerous ties among firm lawyers, particularly
between specialists (clustered in the center) and generalists (on the
periphery and less well-integrated). This supports the theory that the
law firm is a site for resource sharing and social capital exchange,
empowering its partners to strategically collaborate on complex legal
matters that require repeat coordination among teams of lawyers.102
In addition to more accurately representing the practice of law,
the network approach also allows us to theorize about why some law
firms can remain stable, even given the pressures of their broader
environment and the professional regulations that give their attorneys
license to defect at any time. A highly networked law firm has two
primary advantages: (1) the contributions of the other attorneys in the
network magnify the return on investment for any attorney’s human
capital contribution, and (2) a strong law firm network can prevent a
partner from taking firm clients.
The first advantage to a highly networked law firm is that the
network allows teams to pool not only information and skills (which is
particularly important when tasks require the work of specialists), but
also leverage the reputational capital and client ties of the team.
Lawyers who are embedded in a highly cohesive network can more
101
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readily take advantage of the resources available through the firm; less
collegial law firms do not have this advantage.103 Furthermore, sharing
client ties can minimize the likelihood of a client leaving for a rival
firm, as each attorney can marshal resources from each other attorney
to maintain the ties between the client and the firm.
The second advantage to a highly networked law firm is that the
network structure can alleviate tensions between the lawyer and the
firm. The law firm wants the lawyer to build relationships with clients,
as firms whose lawyers embed themselves in client networks are more
successful than those that engage in arm’s-length market relationships,
due to client ties fostering trust and integration.104 The stronger the
bond between the lawyer and their clients, however, the more the
lawyer can leverage the threat of leaving to increase their power within
the law firm.105 Having multiple ties between lawyers and clients is key
to defusing this tension so that one lawyer does not essentially control
the client relationship.
The cohesiveness of the law firm’s network—the reciprocal
exchange between its lawyers—will determine the extent to which any
single partner can create exclusive ties with a client, and thus the
extent to which partners can defect from the firm. This latter
advantage is particularly important, as preventing partner defections
can be critical for law firm survival. Consider the major corporate law
firm collapses since 1984, a list of which is attached as Appendix A.106
The majority of firms on this list (thirty-four out of forty-two)
failed because a series of partner defections triggered a death spiral for
the firm. Professor John Morley has ably documented the factors that
lead to these kind of collapses and has theorized that when partners
lose confidence in the firm as a continuing entity, they race for the
exits in an effort to not get stuck with the liabilities of the firm at the
time of dissolution.107 Almost all of the firms that collapsed were
profitable at the time of their dissolution—just not profitable enough
103

See Emmanuel Lazega, A Theory of Collegiality and its Relevance for Understanding
Professions and Knowledge-Intensive Organizations, in ORGANISATION UND PROFESSION 1, 9–
10 (Thomas Klatetzki & Veronika Tacke eds., 2005) (ebook); see also LAZEGA, supra
note 23, at 147–49; Emmanuel Lazega & Philippa E. Pattison, Multiplexity, Generalized
Exchange and Cooperation in Organizations: A Case Study, 21 SOC. NETWORKS 67, 68 (1999).
104
See Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 674, 694 (1996).
105
See NELSON, supra note 32, at 224–25.
106
Defined as those firms that were listed on either The American Lawyer or National
Law Journal lists of the most prominent law firms.
107
John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse, 75 BUS. LAW. 1399, 1431 (2019–2020).
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to stop the exodus of partners who could leave for more money, more
control, or more stability at another firm.108
D. Some Hypotheses About Firm Growth
Drawing on these environmental, institutional, and network
theories about the firm, I propose to test the following hypotheses
about organic and memetic growth strategies among large corporate
law firms:
1. The Initial Expansion in Firm Size is Directly Related to
Increases in Firm Profitability
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between firm growth
and firm profits earlier in the time-period, but this dissipates over
time.
The first hypothesis uses the organizational ecology model and
suggests that initial firm growth is a product of an organizational
environment where certain firms benefited from consolidation of
clients and the growth of finance. In other words, because all firms
were not equally prepared for the changes, firms did not immediately
respond to the changing environment by all growing at the same time.
Under this theory, initially successful firms expanded in response to
the increasing profitability of their practices, while growth in later
periods is not necessarily associated with profits, as less successful firms
pursued growth as a mimetic response.
2. Successful Firms Are Less Likely to Grow Via Merger or
Lateral Hiring than Firms That are Comparatively Less
Profitable
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between firm profitability and the likelihood of a firm undertaking a lateral acquisition.
The second hypothesis advances the idea that growth via lateral
acquisitions by less successful firms is a mimetic response to the profitfueled growth of more successful firms. As noted previously, lateral
acquisitions are generally not pursued by firms who need to find
lawyers to keep up with increased workload—they are the result of a
deliberate strategy by firm leaders to expand the firm for other
reasons.109 Indeed, none of the top twenty most profitable firms (as

108

See id. at 1400.
See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 3435 (2005) (arguing that firms engaging in lateral hiring often do so to
establish a practice they do not already have).
109
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measured by profits per partner) from the initial The American Lawyer
rankings in 1985 have grown through acquiring other firms. Another
way to phrase this is that initially successful firms were more likely to
grow organically, while less successful firms pursued growth through
acquisitions.
This would also track with organizational research into mimetic
isomorphism more broadly. It is generally only after successful firms
adopt a particular management strategy that the strategy diffuses
throughout the organizational field, as lower status firms observe the
behavior of industry leaders and adopt their practices as symbols of
legitimacy.110
3. Firms that Pursue Mimetic Growth are More Unstable
than Firms that Grow Organically
Hypothesis 3: Firms that engage in lateral hiring are more likely to
collapse in subsequent years than firms that grow organically through
entry-level hiring.
The third and final hypothesis holds that law firms that choose
organic growth have a higher chance of survival compared to firms that
choose mimetic growth via acquisitions of established lawyers. The
risks associated with bringing aboard new lawyers range from concrete
fears about firm finances to intangible concerns about firm culture.111
The former is the risk that offering salary guarantees to new partners
can drag down the profits available to existing partners, exacerbating
tensions within the firm and pushing existing partners to seek greater
fortunes elsewhere.112 The latter is the risk that a sudden influx of lawyers trained and socialized according to a different organizational
ethos can disrupt the culture of the acquiring firm, impairing the sort
of coordination necessary for a successful firm and generating interpersonal conflicts that damage firm morale.113

110

See Haveman, supra note 60.
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 6, at 105.
112
Julie Triedman, How Bingham Failed: The Inside Story, AM. LAW. (Jan. 24, 2015,
12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202713087826.
113
See Jesper B. Sørensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm
Performance, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 70, 73 (2002).
111
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IV. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GROWTH AND MORTALITY
A. The Data
For this dataset, I combined information from several publicly
available sources on law firms. The National Law Journal maintains an
annual list counting the attorneys in the 250 largest law firms by size
(“The NLJ 250”) extending back to 1978. The American Lawyer has kept
its own annual list ranking firm profits for the 200 largest law firms by
revenue (“The AmLaw 200”) since 1985. I defined the population of
interest as law firms that appeared on both lists and thus represented
the largest law firms in terms of both size and profitability (the firms
colloquially known as “BigLaw”).
I defined a lateral acquisition event to be either the hiring of an
entire practice group by a firm or the absorption of another law firm
through merger.
For information about firm mergers and
acquisitions, I searched contemporaneous news reports (including
industry periodicals like the local Crain’s Business Daily publications),
state registration databases, and law firm websites. Lawyer acquisitions
were also identified using the data itself: when a firm showed abrupt
year-over-year growth in the number of partners accompanied by a
drop in the firm’s associate-to-partner leverage statistic, that was an
indication that the firm had laterally acquired a group of experienced
lawyers.
In addition to measures of when firms made lateral acquisitions
or were themselves acquired, the dataset includes variables for total
firm size, growth rate, profits per partner,114 associate-to-partner
leverage, location, and number of offices. The outcome variable for
the survival analysis is firm dissolution. Because some firms were
acquired by another firm and absorbed into that firm, analysis with
survival as an outcome is done in two ways: first, as though the acquired
firm dropped out of the dataset (right-censored), and second, with the
acquired firm sharing the outcome of the firm that acquired it.115
In total, 253 distinct law firms appear on both of these lists at some
point during this twenty-five-year period—though few of these firms
appear on the list for all twenty-five years, as some firms drop off the
list either through contraction, acquisition, or dissolution. Discrete
114

“Profitability is defined as net income per partner, which is typically considered
to be the best measure of business success in professional service firms, much as return
on equity is for conventional enterprises.” Samuelson & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 193.
115
In other words, if Firm B acquired Firm A, and Firm B subsequently collapsed,
Firm A would be assigned to “dissolved” because that was the ultimate outcome for the
lawyers of Firm A, even if Firm A did not technically dissolve.
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outcomes for the firms in the data set are given in Table 1.
Approximately 58.4% of the law firms in this sample acquired one or
more other law firms during this period, while 9.9% of the firms listed
were themselves acquired by another firm, and 9.4% of the law firms
in the sample collapsed entirely (twenty-four total firms).
Of the 253 law firms in the sample, twenty-four firms (9.4%)
collapsed during the time period in question. Some firms, however,
were acquired by another firm that itself subsequently collapsed.
Counting these collapses, of the 253 law firms in the sample, 28 total
firms (11.06%) suffered a catastrophic failure.116
Table 1: Distribution of Discrete Law Firm Outcomes
No Lateral
Acquisitions

At Least One
Acquisition

Total

Survived

83 (79.0%)

121 (81.7%)

204 (80.7%)

Acquired

16 (15.3%)

9 (6.1%)

25 (9.9%)

Dissolved

6 (5.7%)

18 (12.2%)

24 (9.4%)

105 (41.6%)

148 (58.4%)

253

Law Firms

Total

As an initial observation, while only 58% of firms in the overall
sample expanded through acquisition during this period, a full 75%
of the dissolved firms had expanded through acquisition—a significant
difference between the groups. This suggests that, at the very least,
pursuit of growth through acquisition does not increase firm stability,
and that strength in numbers may be illusory for large law firms. Table
2 below describes the mortality outcomes for the firms in the dataset,
including the ultimate outcomes of firms that were acquired by
another firm.

116

Ordinary measures of mortality risk generally involve living organisms and thus
do not address the question of whether a merged firm counts as a single failure (only
one firm went out of business) or a failure for both firms (two law firms undertook a
mimetic growth strategy and both firms ultimately dissolved). In the following
analyses, I have chosen to treat these cases as a dual failure for two reasons. First, from
the perspective of the lawyers in the acquired firm, the dissolution of the merged firm
represents a failure of their original firm as well. Second, it is not quite accurate to
treat these observations as censored, as the acquired firms in the sample did not drop
out of the study (the typical case for right-censored longitudinal data). Thus they
should not be treated as conditionally missing for the purpose of the analysis.
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Table 2: Mortality Outcomes (Including Merged Firms)
Law Firms

Organic
Growth

Mimetic
Growth

Total

Survived

83 (93.2%)

142 (86.5%)

225 (88.9%)

Dissolved

6 (6.7%)

22 (13.5%)

28 (11.06%)

89 (35.2%)

164 (64.8%)

253

Total

Overall, the mortality risk for firms in this sample was relatively
low, both in any given year and overall for the time period in question.
This should be unsurprising—the sample contains only those firms
that have achieved great success, both in terms of profits that rank at
the very top of the profession and in terms of attracting lawyers to join
their organizations.
Additionally, large law firms are unlike typical organizations in
that their fixed costs are comparatively low. Because the provision of
legal services is a knowledge-based industry, equipment purchases
(computers, software, coffee) are minimal, and there are no physical
assets to maintain.117 A law firm has relatively little in the way of
overhead, as its primary outlays are rent (a medium-term obligation)
and wages for staff and junior attorneys. Staff are generally hired atwill, and thus labor costs can be adjusted based on expected revenues.
Moreover, in a partnership structure the members typically share the
residual profit amongst themselves on an annual basis, freeing law
firms of the need to enter into long-term contracts with their top
earners, additionally lowering the risk of the firm being unable to pay
their debts.118 Thus, the mortality risk among these firms should be
lower, both because their membership in the sample is indicative of
their competence and because they are structured such that long-term
liabilities are more avoidable than in other industries. But as we will
117

William Kummel, A Market Approach to Law Firm Economics: A New Model for
Pricing, Billing, Compensation, and Ownership in Corporate Legal Services, 1996 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 379, 383 (1996) (defining personnel and overhead expenses for law firms).
118
That a firm does not need to give its members guaranteed contracts does not
mean that they will not do so, however. Indeed, as discussed previously, guaranteed
contracts are often used by law firms to entice lawyers to switch firms. Similarly, firms
could pay for capital-intensive projects (acquiring property, expanding into new
markets, etc.) out of the partnership draws of the partners instead of taking on debt,
but this is also no guarantee that they will do so.
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see in the following sections, even though the overall mortality risk is
relatively small, survival chances can vary substantially between firms.
B. Law Firm Profits and Law Firm Growth
To begin, I examine the relationship between firm profits and
firm growth. First, I divided the sample into three time periods: the
1980s (the time of upheaval in the market of corporate clients),119 the
1990s (the period that featured the fastest rates of firm growth),120 and
the 2000s (a period of continued firm expansion and increased lateral
hiring).121 Using the lagged year-over-year percentage increase in
profits as the dependent variable,122 and the percentage growth in firm
size as the outcome variable, I fit a simple linear regression model for
each period to identify the association between profits and growth in
these time periods.123

119

See Jones, supra note 5, at 685.
Galanter & Henderson, supra note 19, at 1883–84.
121
William D. Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical Analysis of Lateral
Lawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007: The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1400 (2009).
122
Profit variables in this and other analyses are lagged to account for the longer
lead times necessary to hire lawyers. This is true for both entry-level hiring (summer
associates are hired two years in advance of their graduation, and an offer of
permanent employment is typically extended a year before they can join the firm) and
for lateral hires (which can involve a time-consuming process of identifying and
negotiating with potential candidates). Sherer & Lee, supra note 21, at 111.
123
The model was specified as
, where
represents each observation of a particular firm in a particular year, with time is
lagged for the profits variable. The inclusion of other covariates in the dataset
(partner: associate ratio, firm location, firm size at
) did not meaningfully change
the size or significance of the value of the coefficient on firm growth.
120
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Figure 4: Relationship between Firm Growth and Firm Profits

Figure 4 presents scatter plots of profit increases and growth rates
for each of the three time periods, with a line of best fit from the linear
regression superimposed on the plot in red. The regression
coefficients for firm profits are listed in the corner of each graph and
show a distinct pattern in the relationship between profit and
growth.124
In the 1980s, increases in firm profits do not predict future
growth, as the regression coefficient is small and not statistically
significant. In the 1990s, by contrast, there is a strong and significant
124

I further fit a random intercept model
– with each individual firm given its own cluster-specific intercept to control
for potential unobserved variance between firms. See SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS
SKRONDAL, 1 MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL MODELING USING STATA: CONTINUOUS
RESPONSES 123–38 (3d ed. 2012). Again, however, the size and significance of
did
not meaningfully change. As such, this Article presents the results of the simplest and
most straightforward model.

234

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:201

relationship between the year-over-year increase in profits and the rate
of firm expansion. During this period, a 10% increase in profits would
have been roughly associated with a 2% average increase in firm size
the following year. Finally, in the 2000s, the relationship disappears,
and the rate of firm growth becomes untethered from firm profitability
even as year-over-year firm growth rates spike. These models support
the hypothesis that the growth of law firms was in part the result of a
mimetic strategy rather than a response to firm need.
I next tested whether changes in relative profits were significantly
related to firm growth during the full time period to allow for the
possibility that hiring decisions were based on a firm’s status relative to
its peers. Thus, instead of using the firm’s prior profits as the baseline,
a firm’s profitability was measured relative to the group mean for that
year. Using a hierarchical linear model with a random intercept for
each year in the sample,125 I again regressed firm growth on lagged
firm profits.126 A second model included lagged firm size as a control
variable to account for a potential dependence between growth rate
and size.127 The results are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: Hierarchical Model of Firm Growth and Firm Profits
Firm Growth
Lagged Variables
(1)
(2)
Relative Profits

-0.004
(0.005)

-0.004
(0.005)

3,174

-0.000
(0.000)
3,174

Firm Size
Observations
*

p<0.05**p<0.01***p<0.001

Neither model returned a significant relationship between
relative firm profits and firm growth, indicating that after accounting
for time-specific effects, firm growth is not a direct function of a firm’s

125

Clustering by year allows us to account for unobserved factors unique to each
year that might influence the outcome variable (for example, changes in broader
economic conditions).
126
Varying the lag time for the profits variable between one and three years did not
change the results.
127
Jan Bentzen, Erik Strøjer Madsen & Valdemar Smith, Do Firms’ Growth Rates
Depend on Firm Size?, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 937, 937–38 (2012).
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relative success, lending support to the theory that mimetic
isomorphism accounts for part of law firm growth during this period.
To test the second hypothesis—whether less profitable firms
might be more likely to choose mimetic growth—I fit a structural
equation model using a variable representing whether the firm in
question had made a lateral acquisition that year as a mediating
variable, while keeping firm growth as the outcome variable and
relative profits as the independent variable.128 The structural equation
model was thus simultaneously testing the relationship between profits
and lateral hiring and profits and growth, while accounting for the
mediating effect of lateral hiring on growth.
The results are shown in Table 4 and visualized in Figure 5.
Table 4: Structural Equation
Model of Firm Growth
q

In this model there is a significant negative relationship between
relative firm profits and the choice to build the firm through lateral
hiring, suggesting that less successful firms are more likely to engage
in lateral hiring. Accounting for that relationship, I now also find a
significant and positive (though relatively small) relationship between
relative firm profits and firm growth, indicating that firms with
increasing profits tend to slowly expand their firms without resorting
to mergers or acquisitions.

128

Structural equation models can be used to disaggregate direct and indirect
effects in models where there are multiple causal pathways. See James P. Selig &
Kristopher J. Preacher, Mediation Models for Longitudinal Data in Developmental Research,
6 RES. HUM. DEV. 144, 144–45 (2009); ANDERS SKRONDAL & SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH,
GENERALIZED LATENT VARIABLE MODELING: MULTILEVEL, LONGITUDINAL, AND
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS 75–80 (2004).
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Figure 5: A Path Diagram of Profits, Lateral Hiring, and Growth

Figure 5 is a simplified path diagram of the structural equation
model, and it shows the direct and indirect relationships between
profits and growth, with interpretable coefficients to the paths in the
model. The coefficients on the edges between the nodes in the
diagram give the approximate percentage increase associated with that
node. Roughly speaking, for every $100,000 that a firm’s profits per
partner is above the group average, a firm can expect to expand its size
by about 1% while simultaneously decreasing its chances of engaging
in a future lateral acquisition by about 5%. Meanwhile, a firm that
engages in a lateral acquisition directly increases the size of the firm by
about 18%. The net effect of an increase in relative firm profits is thus
to directly increase predicted firm growth but indirectly decrease
predicted firm growth by lowering the probability of a lateral
acquisition.
These results explain why we do not observe a significant
relationship between relative profits and firm growth, as less successful
firms adopt a mimetic strategy to functionally match the organic
growth of more successful firms. These findings together support
Hypothesis 2, suggesting that a lateral hiring strategy does not occur in
response to increased demand but instead less profitable firms pursue
it as a mimetic response to the growth of its peers.
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C. Law Firm Growth and Law Firm Survival
Finally, in order to test the third hypothesis—that mimetic growth
through lateral hiring increases the risk of firm dissolution—I use
three models to estimate how the odds of dissolution change for firms
using a lateral growth strategy. First, I fit survival curves using the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator, estimating different curves for
organic growth firms and mimetic growth strategy firms in question
engaged in lateral acquisition, and testing to see if the difference in
curves is significant. Next, I use a finer-grained Cox Proportional
Hazards model to estimate the increase in risk to a firm during the
three-year period after a lateral acquisition, controlling for both static
and time-varying covariates.129 Lastly, I run a generalized linear model
for each firm, regressing their dissolution status at the end of the time
period on their use of a lateral acquisition strategy. The results of these
models show a strong relationship between mimetic growth and an
increased risk of firm mortality.
1. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for Firm Growth Strategies
As a first cut at estimating the impact of firm growth on survival, I
generate survival curves using a Kaplan-Meier estimator for each type
of growth strategy. Kaplan-Maier is a non-parametric method for
estimating the probability of a subject surviving each unit of time in
the dataset, conditional on surviving the previous unit.130 For this
sample, the survival curves in Figure 6 represent the cumulative
probability of survival over time for any given firm, differentiated by
method of firm growth. Here, the survival curve for mimetic growth
firms deviates significantly131 from the survival curve for organic growth
firms.132

129

For more on the choice between parametric regression, non-parametric survival
curves, and the Proportional Hazards Model for longitudinal data with time-varying
covariates, see generally Bradley Efron, Logistic Regression, Survival Analysis, and the
Kaplan-Meier Curve, 83 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 414 (1988); Lloyd D. Fisher & D. Y. Lin, TimeDependent Covariates in the Cox Proportional-Hazards Regression Model, 20 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 145 (1999).
130
Jason T. Rich et al., A Practical Guide to Understanding Kaplan-Meier Curves, 143
OTOLARYNGOLOGY—HEAD AND NECK SURGERY 331, 331 (2010).
131
P-values are calculated using the logrank test, which is used to test the hypothesis
that there is no difference in survival between the subgroups at any point in time. J.
Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman, The Logrank Test, 328 BMJ 1073 (2004).
132
Although, the overall survival probability remains high for both types, for the
reasons noted supra Part IV.A.
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Figure 6: Survival Curve for Firms Based On Growth Strategy

2. Cox Proportional Hazard Time-Varying Model
After establishing that there is a significant difference in mortality
risk between the two kinds of firm growth strategies, the next step is to
account for the possibility that other factors could explain the
difference in risk. For example, if firms that are already failing tend to
seek out mergers with other firms (and we have already established
that less profitable firms are more likely to engage in lateral hiring),
then a mimetic growth strategy might be a sign that a firm is in trouble,
rather than the cause of that trouble.
In order to address this possibility, a Cox Proportional Hazards
model allows us to estimate the change in the hazard rate for a given
subject after an event has occurred, while controlling for the preexisting characteristics of that subject.133 Here, the subject is any given
firm, and the event is the period after a firm engages in a lateral
acquisition (a period that I set for the three years following an

133

Fisher & Lin, supra note 129, at 146.
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acquisition).134 In addition, a Cox Proportional Hazards model allows
us to control for both static and time-varying covariates that might
confound estimates of the effect on the odds of mortality that are
associated with a merger.135
In this particular model, the covariates include the three-year
trend in firm profits prior to the merger (to control for the possibility
that less profitable firms are more likely to seek out lateral moves),
relative firm profits (to control for the possibility that firms declining
in status are more likely to seek out lateral moves), lagged firm size (to
control for the possibility that smaller and weaker firms are more likely
to seek out lateral moves), attorney-to-partner leverage (to control for
the possibility that top-heavy firms are more likely to seek out lateral
moves), and number of offices (to control for the possibility that
geographically-stretched firms are more likely to seek out lateral
moves).
Table 5: Cox Proportional Hazards Model
Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Log Odds Ratio)
Dependent variable:
Firm Dissolution
Acquisition Within Prior 3 Years

3.023 (0.720)***

Profits (Lagged)

-0.000 (0.000)

Growth Rate

-0.014 (0.016)

Overall Size

-0.008 (0.003)***

Associate-to-Partner Leverage

1.723 (0.643)***

Offices

0.154 (0.055)***

Observations
Wald Test

572
28.260 (df = 6)
***

*

134

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This model relies on what appears to me to be the reasonable assumption that
the effects of lateral hiring dissipate over time. Results for a five-year risk window
(assuming a longer effect on the firm of a lateral acquisition) were not meaningfully
different than the three-year window.
135
Fisher & Lin, supra note 129, at 152.
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The results, given in Table 5,136 show that even after controlling
for potential confounders such as prior firm profitability and prior
size, the likelihood of firm dissolution increased during the period of
time after a lateral acquisition. This suggests that the choice to engage
in mimetic growth still significantly increases the risk of firm failure,
even though the kind of firms that choose mimetic growth strategies
start out in a less advantageous position to begin with.
3. Regression of Dissolution on Lateral Hiring Strategy
Table 6: GLM Estimation of Firm Failure Based On Lateral Hiring
Strategy
Dependent variable:
Only Original Firms

Including Acquired
Firms

(1)

(2)

Lateral Hiring
Strategy

2.585 (0.786)***

2.328 (0.710)***

Average Profits
Per Partner

-0.000 (0.000)***

-0.000 (0.000)***

Average Leverage

3.021 (0.566)***

2.806 (0.517)***

Average Size

-0.004 (0.002)**

-0.004 (0.002)**

Observations

253

253

136

The coefficients in Table 5 can be interpreted as the change in the log odds of
dissolution given a one unit change in the covariates. Note that because the starting
probability of dissolution is relatively low, the coefficient—which suggests that chances
of dissolution increase dramatically during the period after a lateral acquisition—does
not necessarily translate into a large absolute change in the overall probability of
dissolution.
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-63.590

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The final model, given in Table 6, is a straightforward regression
model, which evaluates the overall risk of firm dissolution during the
time period in question as a function of the firm employing a lateral
hiring strategy, controlling for the observed characteristics of the firm
over the entire time period (including a firm’s average profits, size,
and leverage). As with the previous models, the coefficient on lateral
hiring strategy is positive and significant, which indicates a strong
association between mimetic growth and an increased likelihood of
firm dissolution. Interestingly, the coefficient on average leverage is
also large and significant, suggesting that excess associate-to-partner
leverage may also be a warning sign of a firm in trouble. Each of these
results provides evidence to support Hypothesis 3, and together they
support the ultimate conclusion of law firms that grew organically were
more likely to maintain or build on their initial level of success than
firms that chose mimetic growth as a strategy.
V. DISCUSSION
The results of this empirical analysis support and reinforce the
idea of the firm as a network of strategic actors, and the internal
dynamics unique to law firms helps explain why mimetic growth
undermines firm stability. The data confirmed each of the hypotheses:
(1) increases in firm profits drove early expansion, unlike later
expansion; (2) the relatively less profitable firms were more likely than
their market-leading peers to choose a mimetic method of growth and
hire through lateral acquisition; and (3) the firms that pursued
mimetic growth were more likely to collapse than those that pursued
organic growth.
For the firm that chooses organic growth, hiring a class of
attorneys and having them advance through the firm together builds
social ties between future partners—ties which allow for better
organizational communication and shared internal goals.137 In
addition, organic growth necessarily involves hiring a large number of
incoming associates with the expectation that not all will advance to
partner.138 Existing partners will be more comfortable sharing business

137
138

Sørensen, supra note 113, at 75.
See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 6, at 100–02.
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(and thus ties to clients) with these cohorts of younger attorneys as
compared to lateral hires (who are more established, and thus
represent clearer threats to grab and leave). Finally, one of the more
overlooked consequences of the “promotion-to-partner” tournament
is the potential for placement of associates (the tournament losers) as
in-house counsel at current firm clients—especially valuable because
in-house attorneys gain more power over corporate decisionmaking.139 This is a commonly accepted practice, as clients get an
attorney already familiar with their business, and firms get to establish
another tie with the client.140
This dense network of ties works to bind the firm together, as the
overlapping ties create an interdependency among partners and
practice groups in a firm. Each tie is important in maintaining the
client relationship, and each tie also acts as a leash preventing the
other tied actors from leaving with the client. In this way, multiple ties
reinforce each other and generate new ties. Lawyers with client ties
gain from sharing a client with other lawyers at the firm, both by
leveraging the human capital of other attorneys to build a stronger
relationship with the client, and also as a way of preventing the other
lawyers from dominating the relationship with the client and gaining
leverage against them.
By contrast, the firm that chooses mimetic growth is unlikely to
generate multiple ties between attorneys and clients. A lateral attorney
is likely to be hired because she has ties with clients that the existing
firm attorneys do not have—if the existing firm attorneys had ties to
the lateral attorney’s clients, they would have exploited them already.
In the mimetic growth firm, the relationship between the connected
lawyer and the client is the connected lawyer’s only currency within the
firm. Each tie is a source of leverage against the other actors—and the
only source of value to rival firms—and thus cannot be shared without
diminishing its value. In addition, because lateral attorneys do not
have pre-existing ties with firm attorneys—and because they need to
avoid damaging their relationship with their clients by referring them
to a low-quality attorney—they will be less likely to participate in the
internal network that builds multiple ties between firm and clients.
The result of building a firm out of lateral hires is a more balkanized
firm, one that is less likely to pool resources and more likely to fracture.
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See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 19, at 1896.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are several lessons to be learned from the history of law
firm growth and its consequences for law firm stability. The most
immediately relevant lesson for practitioners is that the lateral hiring
of established lawyers may not pay off for either the firm or the lawyers.
While not every attempt to grow through lateral acquisition will end in
catastrophic failure—the continued success of acquisition-happy firms
like Kirkland & Ellis141 is one of several lateral hiring success stories—
the results indicate that there is a real risk to lateral acquisition as a
strategy.
Moreover, this analysis confirms that bringing the sociology of
organizations into the study of the legal profession can deepen our
understanding of the nature of legal practice. Organizational theory
expands our view of law firms to include the broader environment in
which they operate, the clients on which they depend, the rules and
norms that structure their interactions with their competitors, and the
drive for status and legitimacy that shapes organizational behavior.
While the tie between a lawyer and a client constitutes the core of the
practice of law, the study of the legal profession requires scholars to go
far beyond that foundational relationship.
A final lesson that this analysis makes clear is that there is no
shortcut to create the conditions for law firm success. This is
particularly true for firms that do not have a strong base of institutional
capital and are pursuing growth only to keep up with peer firms. While
organic growth is more costly upfront, and there is no guarantee that
the hires will be a good long-term fit, that strategy is more likely to
strengthen and expand the firm’s network ties and increase firm
stability. Mimetic growth through lateral hiring, on the other hand,
can end up reinforcing the belief among members of the firm that
hoarding client opportunities and maximizing one’s individual
leverage is the appropriate strategy for success.
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lawyers have internalized the “free agent” perspective that guides the firm’s acquisition
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This weakening of firm cohesion—the fraying of the ties that
bind—may not be visible, but even the largest law firms can be
surprisingly fragile.
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APPENDIX A. DISSOLVED NLJ 350 LAW FIRMS (1987–2017)
Name

Office

Finley Kumble

New York

1987

Partner defection

Expanded
via
Acquisition
Yes

Isham Lincoln &
Beale
Wyman, Bautzer,
Kuchel & Silbert
Gaston Snow

Chicago

1988

Partner defection

Yes

Los Angeles

1990

Partner defection

No

Boston

1991

Partner defection

Yes

Wood Lucksinger
& Epstein
Webster Sheffield

Houston

1991

Partner defection

No

New York

1991

Partner defection

No

Frank, Bernstein,
Conaway &
Goldman
Shea & Gould

Baltimore

1992

Real estate bubble

Yes

New York

1994

Partner defection

Yes

New York

1994

Partner defection

Yes

New York

1994

Partner defection

No

San
Francisco
New York

1995

Mass shooting

No

1995

Partner defection

No

Minneapolis

1996

Partner defection

Yes

Chicago

1997

Partner defection

No

Lord Day and
Lord Barrett
Smith
Bower & Gardner
Pettit & Martin
Mudge Rose

Date

Reason for
Dissolution

Popham, Halk,
Schnobrich &
Kaufman
Keck Mahin &
Cate
Hannoch
Weisman P.C
Donovan Leisure

New Jersey

1997

Partner defection

Yes

New York

1998

Partner defection

No

Butler and Binion

Houston

1999

Partner defection

No

Bogle Gates

Seattle

1999

Partner defection

No

Graham & James

San
Francisco
Chicago

2000

Disputed merger

Yes

2000

Partner defection

No

Smith Helms
Mulliss & Moore
Peterson & Ross

Charlotte

2002

Partner defection

Yes

Chicago

2003

Partner defection

Yes

Pennie &
Edmonds
Brobeck Phleger

New York

2003

Partner defection

No

2003

Dot-com bubble

No

Arter & Hadden

San
Francisco
Cleveland

2003

Partner defection

Yes

Altheimer & Gray

Chicago

2003

Disputed merger

Yes

Holleb and Coff
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Name

Office

Expanded
via
Acquisition
Yes

Swidler Berlin

Washington

2004

Partner defection

Testa, Hurwitz

Boston

2005

Dot-com bubble

Coudert Brothers

New York

2006

Partner defection

Yes

Jenkens &
Gilchrist
Heller Ehrman
White &
McAuliffe
Thelen

Dallas

2007

Civil tax liabilities

Yes

San
Francisco

2008

Partner defection

Yes

2008

Partner defection

Yes

Thacher Proffitt
& Wood
Wolf Block

San
Francisco
New York

2008

Real estate bubble

No

Philadelphia

2009

Partner defection

Yes

Adorno and Yoss

Miami

2011

Embezzlement

Yes

Ruden McClosky

2011

Real estate bubble

No

Howrey

Ft.
Lauderdale
Washington

2011

Partner defection

Yes

Dewey & LeBouef

New York

2011

Partner defection

Yes

Bingham
McCutchen
Dickstein,
Shapiro & Morin
Kenyon and
Kenyon
Sedgwick LLP

Boston

2014

Partner defection

Yes

Washington

2015

Partner defection

Yes

New York

2016

Partner defection

No

San
Francisco

2017

Disputed merger

No

No

